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NOTE

CONSENT JUDGMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWSUITS: MORE THAN YOU THOUGHT?

The law of consent judgments is noteworthy for attorneys who settle
environmental citizen suits because, as the Ninth Circuit demonstrated
in Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc.,' courts use a liberal
standard to approve consent judgments in these cases. This standard
allows consent judgments that fund efforts by private plaintiffs that accomplish objectives set forth by environmental statutes. When the courts
and government regulators approve of such judgments, they recognize
that citizen plaintiffs have a role in preserving our natural resources, such
as water, air, and endangered species, that goes beyond deterring polluters.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In February 1987, the Sierra Club filed a complaint in federal district
court against Electronic Controls Design, Inc. (ECD) under the citizen's
suit provision of the Clean Water Act. 2 ECD owns and operates a printed
circuit board manufacturing plant near the Milk Creek which feeds the
Molalla River in northwest Oregon. 3 The Sierra Club alleged that ECD
was violating the terms of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES)4 permit by discharging pollutants from its circuit board
plant into Milk Creek.5 Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act6 prohibits
such discharge. The Sierra Club asked for declaratory and injunctive
relief, litigation costs, and that civil penalties be imposed.7
The parties settled their case before trial. After the Sierra Club filed
its suit, ECD improved its NPDES permit compliance.' Consequently,
the parties submitted a settlement to the district court for entry as a consent
judgment.9 ECD agreed to pay the Sierra Club $45,000 to be distributed
to other private environmental organizations. " ECD also agreed to make
1. 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c) (1988).
3. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 875, 876 (D. Or. 1989).
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
Sierra Club, 703 F Supp. at 876.
33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
Sierra Club, 703 F. Supp. at 876.
Id.

9. Id.

t0. Id. (the Sierra Club keeps none of the $45,000 for itself and the money is to support projects
dedicated to maintaining and protecting water quality).
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additional payments (liquidated damages) to the Sierra Club if ECD violated its NPDES permit between September 1, 1988 and June 1, 1989. "
The United States Department of Justice objected to the proposed
consent judgment. 2 The Department of Justice argued that the judgment
violated the Clean Water Act by directing civil penalties (the settlement
payments) to private organizations instead of to the federal Treasury. 3
The district court agreed with the Department of Justice and refused to
enter the consent judgment.' 4 The court encouraged the parties to amend
the proposed judgment so that the payments would go to the Oregon
Water Quality Program, an official state program. 5 Instead of amending
the proposed judgment, the Sierra Club appealed the decision.' 6
This casenote focuses on one issue from the appeal. Can a consent
judgment in a Clean Water Act citizen suit direct the defendant to pay
funds only to the private plaintiff and not to the U.S. Treasury?' 7 This
issue assumes that such payments are not civil penalties and the Ninth
Circuit validated that assumption. "8The Ninth Circuit concluded the proposed consent judgment should be entered as the judgment met the legal
requirements to be valid. 9 The appellate court remanded the case to the
district court with instruction to enter the consent judgment.20
THE LAW OF CONSENT JUDGMENTS
A consent judgment"' is an alternative for parties who wish to settle
their case but want a resolution more easily enforceable than an out of
court settlement.' A consent judgment is a settlement that a court has
ll. Id.
12. Sierra Club. 703 F. Supp. at 876. ("No consent judgment shall be entered in an action in
which the United States is not a party prior to 45 days following the receipt of a copy of the proposed
consent judgment by the Attorney General and the Administrator." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)3 (1988)).
13. Sierra Club, 703 F. Supp. at 876. The government also argued that the settlement directed
money to projects which did not satisfy the Environmental Protection Agency's settlement policy.
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-27, Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design,
Inc., 909 F. 2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-35120) [hereinafter Amicus Brief). The Ninth Circuit
deemed the government's argument over the settlement policy as immaterial to the case. Sierra
Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1354 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990).
14. Sierra Club, 703 F. Supp. at 876-879.
15. Id. at 879. The court noted that other district courts have entered consent judgments where
civil penalties were paid to state water pollution funds. Id.
16. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d 1350. The Department of Justice did not intervene but appeared as
amicus in the appeal; ECD did not argue in the appeal as it approved of the settlement. Id. at 1352.
17. Id. at 1355.
18. Id. at 1354 (civil penalties must go to the Treasury, not private entities).
19. Id. at 1356.
20. Id. at 1356.
21. The terms judgment and decree are synonymous for purposes of this note. Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(a).
22. Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and Setlement. 72 Harv. L.
Rev. 1314, 1314-16 (1959).
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entered, at the parties' consent, as a judgment.23 Consent judgments
combine aspects of private contracts and judicial decrees. 24
Once entered, consent judgments are difficult to modify because courts
prefer the balance of equities as struck by the parties' own bargain.'
Consent judgments are easier to enforce than private contracts as contempt
citations are available. 26 But like contracts, consent judgments rely on
the parties' mutual consent for their legal force and are only entered when
both parties agree to the judgment.2 7 Consent judgments also have the
effect of res judicata" and, sometimes, collateral estoppel. 29
Courts apply a liberal standard when assessing proposed consent judgments." Consent judgments may grant broader relief than a judgment
after trial. 3 For example, parties might agree to specific performance as
part of a consent judgment when the court could only grant damages after
trial. Courts "need not inquire into the precise legal rights of the parties
nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy ....

32

Consent judgments must satisfy three requirements. 33 First, the judgment must be within the scope of the pleadings; this requirement is easily
satisfied.' Second, judgments must further the objective of the law from
which the complaint is based. 35 This is the least precise of the require-

ments. Consent judgments need not work precisely to meet the objective
of the- relevant law, just come reasonably close. 6 Finally, judgments
23. Id.
24. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)
(citing to IB J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, 0.409[5], p. 331 (1984)).
25. Jost, From Swift to Stots and Beyond: Modification of Injunction in the FederalCourts, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 1101, 1129-31 (1986).
26. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 524 n.13.
27. Id. at 522 (citing to United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964) (cannot enter
consent judgment where only one party has consented as the court's authority to enter such ajudgment
springs from all parties' consent)). Both parties in Sierra Club wanted the consent judgment and
thus, consent was not an issue.
28. 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, 0.409(51, p. 333 (1991).
29. Id. at 0.43313], pp. 799-816.
30. Branfinan, Antitrust Consent Decrees-A Review and Evaluationof the FirstSeven Years Under
the Antitrust Proceduresand PenaltiesAct, 27 Antitrust Bull. 303, 348-52 (1982); Scharzschild,
PublicLaw by PrivateBargain:Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairnessof NegotiatedInstitutional
Reform, 1984 Duke L.J. 887, 908.
31. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 526 (1986).
32. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 728 F.2d 117I, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
to Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir.
1980)).
33. The initial issue of whether a court has jurisdiction to enter a consent judgment is not discussed.
This casenote assumes jurisdiction exists.
34. Local No. 93, Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 526 (citing to Pacific R.R. Co. v.
Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880) (for consent judgments, parties may agree to any matters that
are in reference to the subject matter of their litigation)).
35. Local No. 93,Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters,478 U.S. at 526.
36. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979) (action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). Title VII has the purpose of securing relief for past and possible future

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

cannot violate the law.37 Overall, courts assess proposed consent judgments by whether they are "fair, adequate, reasonable and appropriate
under the particular facts....
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
SierraClub illustrates the liberal standard courts use to review consent
judgments. The Ninth Circuit found the three requirements for a valid
consent judgment not difficult to satisfy. This result is consistent with the
ordinary law of consent judgments.
The consent judgment met the problem stated by the complaint and
reflected the complaint.39 The consent judgment and the Sierra Club's
complaint sprang from the same event, ECD discharging pollutants from
its manufacturing plant.'a Thus, the consent judgment fell within the scope
of the pleadings."
The consent judgment satisfied the second requirement of valid consent
judgments because the judgment furthered the Clean Water Act's objective."2 In the consent judgment, ECD agreed to comply with its NPDES
permit.' NPDES permit compliance specifically furthers the Act's objective of reducing and eliminating pollution." But the appellate court
also noted that the judgment furthered the Act's objective by funding

projects of private environmental organizations."5

employment discrimination. Id. at 799. The court upheld the consent judgment as sufficiently
satisfying the purpose of Title VII. Id. The consent judgment provided for no discrimination in
future persotnel actions by Safeway but did not address past discrimination. Id. The court held that
consent judgments may vary from statutory purposes to some degree to facilitate voluntary settlement.
Id. See also Gorsuch, 718 F.2d at 1125. D.C. Circuit rejected attack on consent judgment that had
more criteria for toxic waste regulations than required by the Clean Water Act. Id. The court noted
that the judgment was consistent with the purpose of the Act, that purpose being to curb water
pollution. Id.
37. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 527 (parties may not agree "to take
action that conflicts with or violates the statute [that is the source of their dispute]").
38. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 728 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing
to Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir.

1980)).
39. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Recall that the Act's stated objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
43. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1355.
44. Id. (citing to Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 875, 878
(D. Or. 1989)). NPDES permits are part of the Act's regulatory scheme to achieve the Act's objective.
See Committee For Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1007-08
(4th Cir. 1976).
45. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1355. The projects are all in Oregon. Sierra Club's Opening Brief
On Appeal at 7 n.3, Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1990) (No. 89-35120) [hereinafter Opening Brief].
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The judgment, by an objective standard, is not specific in how the
projects further the Act's objective. The judgment describes the projects
as "future activities to maintain and improve water quality in Oregon
. ... [acquiring] wetlands in Oregon. . . [funding] public education and
projects to maintain and improve water quality in Oregon... [and]...

future activities to maintain and protect surface and groundwater quality
in Oregon." ' Yet, the Ninth Circuit accepted these projects. Thus, a
consent judgment can act sufficiently to further a statutory objective through
private projects that generally help achieve that objective.
A liberal standard for whether a consent judgment furthers a statutory
objective is reasonable. The statutory objective in Sierra Club is broad
because activities of private or governmental entities can work to "restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 7 The issue of a valid consent judgment was reviewed for
abuse of discretion.' This standard of review reflects the Ninth Circuit's
acceptance of a liberal standard. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the
Act's legislative history favors settling cases with funds directly put towards environmental protection. 49
The Ninth Circuit examined the Act's legislative history in determining
that the consent judgment did not violate the Act by directing funds
straight to private organizations. The Ninth Circuit found sparse, but
positive, congressional intent that consent judgments in Clean Water Act
suits need not direct funds to the U.S. Treasury.' ° The Act does not
expressly restrict consent judgments regarding any transfer of funds.
Before 1987, the Act made no mention of consent judgments. 5 In
1987, Congress amended the Act to require that the Attorney General
have an opportunity to review all proposed consent judgments. 2 The
amendment did not specify that private organizations could not receive
money in consent judgments.5" The Ninth Circuit concluded from this
sparse legislative history that the Act allows consent judgments that direct
money only to private environmental organizations.'
46. Opening Brief, supra note 45, at 25 n.15.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988) (stated objective of the Clean Water Act).
48. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1356.
49. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 875, 877 (D. Or. 1989)
(citing to H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 139 (1986), reprintedin 132 Cong. Rec.
H10,571 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986), noting settlements that "preserve the punitive nature of enforcement actions while putting the funds collected to use on behalf of environmental protection" are to
be encouraged).
50. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1356.
51. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § at 7, 101 Stat. 7, 75 (codified at 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(c)3 (1988)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sierra Club, 909 F.2d at 1356.
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ANALYSIS OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

Sierra Club will affect consent judgments in citizen suits under other
environmental statutes as well. Comparing some other environmental
statutes to the Clean Water Act, two similarities arise: breadth of objective
and lack of provisions barring consent judgments that direct all funds
paid under the judgment to private plaintiffs. These similarities involve
the key issues55 that led the Ninth Circuit to uphold the consent judgment
in Sierra Club: whether the judgments further statutory objectives and
whether the judgments violate the statutes.
Objectives of Other Environmental Statutes
In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit found that a valid consent judgment
may include methods that do not work precisely to further a statutory
objective. Furthermore, a liberal standard for consent judgments is appropriate when the statutory objective is broad. Thus, for an environmental protection statute similarly broad in objective as the Clean Water
Act, a consent judgment similar to that in Sierra Club would be possible.
The objectives of the Clean Air Act, Endangered Species Act, Resource
Recovery and Conservation Act (RCRA), and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), are all
broad like the Clean Water Act. The Clean Air Act's objective is to
protect public health through the abatement of air pollution.' The objectives of the Endangered Species Act are to conserve endangered wild
species 7 and protect their habitats.5" RCRA's stated objectives'are to
promote "the protection of health and the environment and to conserve
valuable material and energy resources.""' CERCLA's objective is to
make those responsible for improper past hazardous waste disposal that
causes health and environmental problems bear the costs of cleaning up
such disposal.'
The Clean Air Act, RCRA, and the Endangered Species Act, like the
Clean Water Act, have objectives broad enough so that activities by
private entities can address those objectives. CERCLA's objective can
be addressed by private entities and CERCLA expressly seeks to ensure
funding of activities that clean up the air, water, and land.
55. The first requirement of the settlement being within the scope of the pleadings is assumed to
be satisfied here. This first requirement is quite mechanical compared to the other two requirements.
56. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. United States E.P.A., 415 F. Supp. 799, 805 (W.D. Mo.
1976).
57. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 181-85 (1978).
58. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D.
Haw. 1986), af'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
59. 42 U.S.C. §6902(a) (1988).
60. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir.
1986).

Fall 1991)1

CONSENT JUDGMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSUITS

927

The legislative history of all four statutes supports the propriety of
awarding funds directly for protecting natural resources. The Clean Air

Act's legislative history includes written testimony that voluntary settlements should be encouraged in citizen suits."' This testimony shows that
Congress knew the citizen suit provision would give rise to actions that
might be resolved in consent judgments. Still, Congress chose not to

enact restrictions on such judgments. The Clean Air Act has also been
amended recently so that funds can be more directly channeled to projects
that address air pollution.6'

RCRA's legislative history shows that Congress favored strengthening

citizen enforcement. 63 At the same time, Congress did not place any

restrictions on consent judgments in RCRA citizen suits." This strengthening of citizen suits and simultaneously not restricting consent judgments
is similar to the Clean Water Act legislative history that validated the
Sierra Club consent judgment.65
CERCLA's legislative history shows congressional intent similar to
that of RCRA.' In addition, Congress clearly preferred settling govern-

ment enforcement actions and emphasizing expediting clean up actions.67
This preference is significant when combined with the intent that there
61. See HearingsBefore Subcommittees on Air and Water Pollutionof the Committee on Public
Works United States Senate on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 1590 (1970).
62. Comment, Polluter-Financed Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures:Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?, 21 Envtl. L. 176, 206-07 (1991)
[hereinafter Comment]. Congress created a special fund for civil penalties assessed in citizen suits
under the Clean Air Act. In lieu of having civil penalties paid to the special fund, courts may direct
civil penalty funds to "beneficial mitigation projects which are consistent with... [the Clean Air
Act]... and enhance the public health or the environment." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-549, § 707(b), 104 Stat. 2399, 2682-83 (990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)).
63. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, §401(b)2, 98
Stat. 3221, 3269 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988)) [hereinafter Pub. L. No. 98-616].
The purpose of the 1984 amendments is "to make... [changes]... in the Act in order to assure
adequate protection of public health and the environment." H.R. Rep. No. 98-198, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. I at 18 (1984). The House noted that, besides insufficient progress in redressing the solid
waste problem, "[elqually distressing is the inadequate effort by the [EPA] with respect to criminal
and civil enforcement actions." Id. at 20. Thus, Congress sought to strengthen citizen enforcement
by allowing courts to assess civil penalties in citizen suits. Pub. L. No. 98-616, supra.
64. See Pub. L. No. 98-616, supra note 63.
65. See supratext accompanying notes 51-54.
66. CERCLA's 1986 amendments raised civil penalties, enacted a settlement provision for government enforcement actions, and added a citizen suit provision. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 109, 122, 206, 100 Stat. 1613, 1633, 1678, 1703
(1986) (§ 109 is civil penalties, § 122 is settlements, and § 206 is citizen suits) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§9608, 9621, 9659 (1988)). The amendments manifest Congress's view of citizen suits as an
essential supplement to government enforcement. Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 14850 (D. R.I. 1989). The House noted that the amendments should encourage settlements in government enforcement actions and thus, expedite clean up action. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253 (1), 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 58-59 (1985). The two points of concentrating more on actual clean up work instead of
litigation and that citizen suits are an essential supplement to government enforcement shows Congress's support of settlements like that in Sierra Club.
67. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1985).
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be potent citizen suits to supplement government enforcement. The combination shows support for quick and efficient enforcement lawsuits. The
suits should settle, preferably with the result of furthering activity (government or private) to address the affected natural resource.
The Endangered Species Act also has little legislative history regarding
consent judgments in citizen suits. There is positive legislative history
that Congress supports private efforts to conserve endangered species,
but in a limited fashion." Nevertheless, Congress does recognize that
private effort can further the Act's objective. A court drawing on the
liberal standard in Sierra Club should validate a consent judgment that
funds private activity to preserve endangered species.
Settlements Do Not Violate Statutes

In Sierra Club, the appellate court concluded that the Clean Water Act
did not prohibit the entry of the consent judgment. The court noted both
the lack of any language in the Act prohibiting such consent judgments
and the positive legislative history regarding Congress's attitude
toward72
7
such judgments.' The Clean Air Act,' Endangered Species Act, RCRA,
and CERCLA 3 all lack language which might prohibit consent judgments
directing money to private entities. These statutes all have some legislative
history suggesting such judgments are appropriate. 4
POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING SIERRA CLUB
CONSENT JUDGMENTS
The most significant benefit of Sierra Club consent judgments is that
funds paid by alleged violators go directly to protecting natural resources.' Congress is aware of this benefit and has enacted legislation
that permits more direct funding of work to preserve the environment by
68. The 1978 amendments to the Act included provisions for allowing private efforts to preserve
endangered species through captive breeding for eventual release into the wild. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 95-1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 (1987). Congress supports such private efforts by exemptions
in the "taking" provision of the Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538-39 (1988).
69. Supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (citizen suit provision, no language restricting settlements that
direct money to private environmental organizations).
71. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988) (citizen suit provision).
72. See 42 U.S.C. §6972 (1988).
73. See 42 U.S.C. §9622 (1988) (CERCLA does address consent judgments in government
enforcement actions but no similar provision was enacted to address citizen suits).
74. Supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
75. Boyer & Meidinger, PrivatizingRegulatory Enforcement:A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen
Suits UnderFederalEnvironmentalLaws, 34 Buffalo L. Rev. 833, 932-33 (1985). For an extensive
sample of district court cases entering such consent judgments, see Opening Brief, supra note 45
at 16-23.
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violators of the Clean Air Act. 6 The Environmental Protection Agency
also recognizes that direct funding is productive.'
Moreover, consent judgments represent an economically efficient allocation of funds. This is true because consent judgments are the product
of bargaining coupled with the strict enforcement of the bargain through
the judicial mechanism of contempt.'
There is potential for abuse of SierraClub consent judgments. Citizens
plaintiffs, for example environmental groups, may become bounty hunters
looking for a wealthy defendant, hoping to raise funds for themselves
through a lucrative judgment. There is also the problem of ensuring that
the judgment money actually goes towards furthering a statute's objectives.
However, there are safeguards against abuse. Citizen plaintiffs must
establish standing to bring suit against private defendants; otherwise, the
parties have no access to the court for entry of a consent judgment."9
Citizen plaintiffs establish standing by showing injury to themselves and
not by asserting the rights of other citizens who are injured.' Standing
remains a significant-hurdle for citizen suits under federal environmental
law " ' and given this hurdle, bounty hunting by environmental groups is
unlikely.
Three other safeguards ensure that consent judgments actually further
the relevant environmental statute and are not the product of collusive
action by the parties. First, all of the environmental statutes examined

require that citizen plaintiffs notify the government of their intent to
litigate.82 Government regulators have the opportunity to monitor pro-

posed consent judgments and may intervene or at least make their ob-

jection known to the court. 3 Second, consent judgments must still survive
the scrutiny of the courts before being entered." A liberal standard for

76. Cf. Comment, supra note 62.
77. See Memorandum of Environmental Protection Agency, New Clean Water Act Penalty Policy
(Feb. 11, 1986) (located in Opening Brief, supra note 13 (included in the addendum)).
78. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 337-40 (1972) (this proposition can be skewed
depending on the parties' relative bargaining position, but this goes beyond the scope of this note).
79. See supra note 33.
80. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
454 U.S. 464,474 (1982) (citing to Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975)); see Beers, Standing
and Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, I J. EnvtL. L, and Litigation 65, 6771(1986).
81. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n., 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187-89 (1990) (citizen plaintiffs must
be specific in proof of injury to themselves to defeat summary judgment motion for lack of standing).
See generally Beers, supra note 80 at 65-78.
82. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7604
(1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Resource Recovery and Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(b)-(c) (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§9659(b), 9659(e) (1988).
83. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1986).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
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entry of consent judgments does not mean that courts automatically approve consent judgments. Third, consent judgments clearly do not prevent
the government or other citizens from later suing a defendant because
consent judgments are binding only on parties to the judgment."
Another policy issue for consent judgments is their deterrence value.
Consent judgments, like that in Sierra Club, do deter future acts against
the environment as effectively as civil penalties. Civil penalties deter
based on their amount and not because the money goes to the Treasury.
Thus, the policy surrounding consent judgments like that in Sierra
Club favors such judgments, and illuminates the role of citizen plaintiffs
in preserving natural resources. Citizen suits are an essential supplement
to government enforcement but the consent judgment in Sierra Club
shows that citizen plaintiffs have a role beyond deterring violation of
federal environmental law.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act allows consent judgments that direct money to citizen plaintiffs for projects to preserve the
environment. The appellate court applied a liberal standard for validating
the consent judgment. SierraClub's broad implication is that such judgments are available under other major federal environmental statutes.
While there is potential for abuse of such judgments, abuse is unlikely
because there are safeguards. Moreover, Sierra Club manifests jurisprudential recognition that citizen plaintiffs serve a larger role than deterring
the abuse of natural resources. Citizen plaintiffs have a valued role of
directly preserving natural resources through their projects and thereby
further the objectives of environmental statues protecting such resources.
Government's efficiency in protecting natural resources is continually
called into question. Federal programs to protect natural resources are
good at addressing problems on a national scale, but often have difficulty
addressing particular local problems. Government is not the only solution
to protecting natural resources everywhere. Citizens themselves can also
be part of the solution. Thus, it makes good sense when courts allow
consent judgments that fund citizen groups and their projects with money
from violators of federal environmental law.
MITCHEL S. JOFUKU

85. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 529.

